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Cyprus unlikely to join the Schengen Area in 2026

Cyprus unlikely to join the Schengen Area in 2026
Credit: Turgut Denizgil

The Cyprus Investigative Reporting Network (CIReN) examined the Republic of Cyprus’ declared plan to join the Schengen Area in 2026. Is the process simply a matter of meeting technical goals, or does Cyprus’ “special situation” carry political dimensions that remain unaddressed? CIReN conducted a fact-check and issued its verdict.

The Claim

“A tremendous effort is underway until the end of 2025 from a technical point of view — that is our goal. As a state, we will have completed everything necessary for the Republic of Cyprus to join the Schengen Area in 2026.”

Statements by President Nikos Christodoulides, May 2025

The Facts

The Republic of Cyprus, which joined the European Union in 2004, is legally obliged to join the Schengen Area. Today, it is the only EU member state not participating in Schengen, apart from Ireland, which opted out to avoid creating a “hard” border with the United Kingdom. 

Cyprus formally submitted its application to join the Schengen Area in September 2019, and in July 2023 the island joined the Schengen Information System, which allows member states to share security and border control alerts in real time. In 2024, the European Commission acknowledged Cyprus’s progress, while noting that it “takes into account its special circumstances.”

In May, President Nikos Christodoulides stated unequivocally that Cyprus will join the Schengen area in 2026, and that all technical requirements will be met by his government by the end of 2025. 

CIReN reached out to the European Commission to confirm, and received a reply from spokesperson Fiorella Boigner that “the full participation of Cyprus in the Schengen Area must be accompanied by the necessary safeguards, taking into account the island’s specific situation,” adding that this includes “upholding the highest of security standards of the Schengen Area.”

Agios Dometios Checkpoint. Credit: CIReN

“Special Situation”

Repeated references to “special” circumstances indicate that the island’s de facto political division complicates the obligation for Schengen Area’s border control requirements.

In April, the EU’s Commissioner for Home Affairs, Magnus Brunner told Cypriot MEP Michalis Hadjipantelas that “Cyprus’ integration into the Schengen area requires due respect to its special situation and the framework applicable in line with Protocol 10,” a reference to Cyprus’s EU Accession Treaty, which suspends the application of EU law in the areas that are not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus government — specifically, the northern part of the island. 

Brunner emphasized that “the Commission stands ready to engage in a dialogue with Cyprus on how this [integration into the Schengen area] can be achieved, including with regard to the Green Line.” 

Bruner’s statement indicated that as of April, Cyprus had not initiated dialogue with the European Commission on how to implement Schengen obligations concerning the Green Line.

The Green Line is the United Nations-administered buffer zone that divides Cyprus between the south, which is under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus, and the north, where the EU law is suspended. There are 9 checkpoints along the Green Line that allow crossings between the two sides but it is not an external EU border. Protocol 10 empowers the Council of the European Union, to determine how EU law applies along the dividing line. To this end, the Council adopted the Green Line Regulation (GLR) in April 2004, which establishes the legal framework for the controlled movement of goods and persons across the Green Line.

To check if formal discussion were taking place within the Cypriot leadership, CIReN contacted party leaders from both the governing coalition and the opposition, who regularly participate in meetings of the National Council — the advisory body composed of parliamentary party leaders and chaired by the President. 

Stefanos Stefanou, leader of the opposition party AKEL, told CIReN that “since 2021, when I joined the National Council, no such discussion took place.” This was confirmed by the leader of the ruling DEPA, Marios Karoyan, who told CIReN that “our party was only briefed in bilateral meetings with the government that they proceed to join Schengen”. 

Meanwhile, experts raise important concerns about the complexities of the “special situation.”

Since all Schengen Area countries are required to maintain effective surveillance and control of their external borders, for Cyprus fulfilling this obligation may require a special derogation or legal arrangement concerning the Green Line—particularly to address key provisions of the Schengen acquis. Such a derogation or formula would need unanimous approval by all 29 Schengen Member States.

Additionally, because the Green Line Regulation (GLR) explicitly prohibits “border checks,” a revision of the GLR may be necessary to introduce an operational exception that aligns with Schengen requirements. Any such amendment would require a proposal by the European Commission and approval by the Council through qualified majority voting.

Currently, crossings at the Green Line involve identity checks that are simple and explicitly not border checks, as stipulated by the GLR. Turkish Cypriots can cross the Green Line using either official documents issued by the Republic of Cyprus or alternative documents that verify their Cypriot identity — including documents issued by the breakaway Turkish Cypriot state. 

Of the 168,000 Turkish Cypriots born on the island, some 130,000 hold identification documents from the Republic of Cyprus, leaving some 38,000 people with documentation only from the administration in the north, according to data obtained by CIReN. An estimated 70,000 individuals are members of families of mixed marriages, creating a further complication. If the ROC is turned into an external Schengen border, the lives of more than 100,000 Cypriots would be affected.

Moreover, the implementation of Schengen-level checks is expected to increase processing time per person, and cause longer queues especially during peak hours, when Cypriots travel for individual needs, bicommunal cooperation, work and school. Full inspections for vehicle crossings may also be necessary. These additional requirements could necessitate the expansion of existing infrastructure, the creation of separate lanes for different categories of travelers, the reinforcement of staff, as well as the opening of new crossing points.

In addition, Schengen obligations require Member States to prevent and detect illegal border crossings, process asylum applications, and return irregular migrants. In Cyprus, the uncontrolled movement of irregular migrants from the northern part of the island across the 180km Green Line poses a significant operational and political challenge.

For example, in May 2024, Republic of Cyprus authorities denied 142 asylum‑seekers, including 35 children, who attempted to cross from the north, causing them to be stranded in the buffer zone for months. The UN Secretary General has publicly criticized Cyprus for denying migrants access to asylum procedures, which authorities claim they are not obliged to do. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus spokesperson Aleem Siddique told CIReN that matters concerning the Green Line, in the context of Schengen obligations and surveillance, “are primarily for the Republic of Cyprus and the EU to answer.” 

He added that “there have been no formal consultations with UNFICYP on this issue so far” and underlined that “the Republic of Cyprus retains responsibility for operating the checkpoints and all immigration controls.”

The Verdict: Misleading


President Christodoulides’s claim that Cyprus will join the Schengen Area in 2026 is misleading.

Why?

Technical Readiness

Although Cyprus has made progress during the last two years and recently accelerated efforts, its first full Schengen evaluation is still ongoing and major recommendations — particularly regarding external border control, return procedures, and visa issuance — remain unimplemented.

Evaluation Still in Progress

Additional verification missions and on-the-ground checks are still required. There is no indication that the Commission will issue a Schengen Evaluation Report to confirm Cyprus’s compliance by the end of the year.

Legal and Political Complexity

Transforming the Green Line into a Schengen-standard external border — without triggering significant political and legal consequences — has not been addressed by the government.

Unanimity of 29 Schengen Members Required

Even if Cyprus completes all technical requirements, full Schengen accession still requires unanimous approval from all 29 Schengen member states. These steps are not guaranteed.

Conclusion:

Schengen accession requires technical completion, legal arrangements, and political consensus — all of which remain pending.

The fact that as of June 2025 there’s no indication of ongoing dialogue on the border and Green Line issues makes the President’s statement misleading, as it overstates Cyprus’ readiness and downplays the serious unresolved legal and political challenges.

This project is supported by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF). The sole responsibility for any content supported by the European Media and Information Fund lies with the authors and it may not necessarily reflect the positions of the EMIF and the Fund Partners, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the European University Institute.









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